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Abstract 
 
This study examines the association between related party transactions and earnings man-
agement, based on a sample of 50 Indonesian publicly listed companies for the periods ending 2004 
and 2005. The hypothesis developed in this study draw on past literature and the tenets of agency 
theory which suggest that the existence of related party transactions represent potential conflict of 
interest which may results in earnings management and appropriation by controlling shareholder 
to minority shareholders. The empirical findings of the study suggest that there is no statistically 
significant evidence of the association between related party transactions and earnings manage-
ment attributes. Additional sensitivity analysis conducted with alternative measures of earnings 
management and related party transactions confirm the initial regression results. The results of this 
study suggest that the mere presence of related party transactions in Indonesian companies does 
not necessarily indicate that management engage in greater earnings management. This study pro-
vides a valuable starting point for similar research in other developing countries. 
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Abstrak 
 
Penelitian ini menguji hubungan antara transaksi-transaksi diantara pihak-pihak yang berhub-
ungan dan manajemen laba, berdasarkan data dari 50 perusahaan yang terdaftar di pasar modal 
dalam periode 2004 dan 2005. Hipotesis dibangun dari penelitian-penelitian sebelumnya yang 
terkait dengan teori keagenan yang menyatakan bahwa keberadaan transaksi-transaksi diantara 
pihak-pihak yang berhubungan berpotensi untuk menimbulkan konflik kepentingan sehingga 
menghasilkan manajemen laba dan kecenderungan pengendalian pemegang saham untuk 
pemegang saham minoritas. Temuan empiris dari studi menunjukkan bahwa tidak ada bukti 
statistik yang signifikan dari hubungan antara transaksi pihak terkait dan atribut manajemen laba. 
Sensitivitas analisis tambahan dilakukan dengan langkah-langkah alternatif pendapatan 
manajemen pemerintah dan transaksi pihak terkait mengkonfirmasi hasil regresi awal. Hasil studi 
ini menunjukkan bahwa Kehadiran transaksi pihak terkait di perusahaan-perusahaan Indonesia 
tidak selalu menunjukkan bahwa manajemen laba yang lebih besar. Studi ini merupakan  titik awal 
yang berharga untuk penelitian serupa di negara-negara berkembang lainnya.  
 
Kata Kunci: manajemen laba, transaksi pihak terkait, Indonesia 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to investi-
gate whether there is an association between 
related party transactions (RPTs)1 and earn-
ings management (EM)2 in Indonesian public-
ly listed companies. The hypothesis is based 
on agency theory tenets concerning the separa-
tion of ownership, conflict of interest and in-
formation asymmetry. This study utilises a 
sample of Indonesian publicly listed compa-
nies for the periods ending 2004 and 2005. 
The modified Jones (1991) accruals3 estima-
tion model is used to measure discretionary 
accruals (the proxy for EM). 
EM and RPTs are very important as-
pects of financial reporting over the years and 
have been under intense media after a series of 
spectacular corporate collapses (e.g. Enron 
using their Special Purpose Entities) (Jian and 
Wong, 2004). These RPTs are usually com-
plex and differ between companies depending 
on factors such as the ownership structure and 
the nature of the business. Gordon and Henry 
(2005: 1) argues that,” users of financial re-
ports view the existence of RPTs as an indica-
tor of increased likelihood of aggressive ac-
counting”. Furthermore, American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) sug-
gests that one of the important and difficult 
aspects of financial statement audit is the iden-
tification of related parties and transactions 
with related parties. “Related parties such as 
controlled entities, principal stockholders or 
management can execute transactions that im-
properly inflate earnings by masking their 
economic substance or distort reported results 
through lack of disclosure, or can even de-
fraud the company by transferring funds to 
conduit related parties and ultimately the per-
petrators” (AICPA, 2001, p.5).  
As a result of the increase significance 
of these issues, government and standard set-
ters have increased the emphasis of regula-
tions on RPTs as can be seen in the United 
States Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the Aus-
tralian Commonwealth Government’s Corpo-
rate Law and Economic Reform Program 
(CLERP 9) and Australian Securities and In-
vestment Commissions’ (ASIC) (2005) cam-
paign. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
amended disclosure requirements of RPTs via 
the Section 402 provisions with enhanced con-
flict of interest disclosures. The CLERP 9 Bill 
set out that government proposed legislative 
response on corporate disclosure including the 
disclosure of the executive remuneration and 
policies (Allens, et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
ASIC have announced campaign to crack 
down on related party (RP) disclosure docu-
ments and to ensure that shareholders receive 
sufficient information to make a decision about 
whether to grant RP benefits (ASIC, 2005).  
EM is a vibrant area in accounting re-
search. There are numerous publications and 
research which examine EM by measuring 
companies’ discretionary accruals (Jones, 
1991). These publications investigate the rela-
tion of EM with respect to many issues such 
as auditor independence (Frankel, Johnson, 
and Nelson, 2002), auditor specialization 
(Krishnan, 2003) and corporate governance 
(Peasnell, et al., 2006). However, research 
published regarding the issue of EM with 
RPTs are still limited. Although there are stud-
ies conducted to investigate the issue of RP 
and tunneling4, they focus on the market valu-
ation effects of this behaviour (Claessens, et 
al., 2000). This study seeks to fill the gap in 
the literature through the investigation of RPTs 
and EM in Indonesian publicly listed compa-
nies.  
Several studies found that Indonesia 
has characteristics that might indicate high 
level of RPTs and EM. Past researchers pro-
pose that Indonesia has high concentration 
level of ownership (La Porta, et al., 1999; 
Claessens, et al., 2000), low level of transpar-
ency and disclosure quality5 (Fan and Wong, 
2002), low efficiency of judicial system, low 
rating in rule of law, significantly high corrup-
tion level and moderate risk of expropriation 
(La Porta, et al., 1999). According to Leuz, et 
al., (2003: 508), “earnings management is 
more pervasive in countries [like Indonesia6] 
where the legal protection of outside investor 
is weak, because in these countries insider en-
joy greater private control benefits and hence 
have stronger incentives to obfuscate firm per-
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formance”7. These characteristics that Indone-
sia possessed indicate possible high levels of 
RPTs consequently high level of EM. Indone-
sia thus provides an important setting to test 
the association between EM and RPTs. 
This study contributes to the account-
ing literature in several ways. Firstly, this 
study provides further evidence on the asso-
ciation of RPTs with EM8. Despite worldwide 
media and government attention over the con-
cern of RPTs involved in recent corporate col-
lapses, there is little rigorous academic re-
search conducted to investigate the extent of 
RPTs in companies and their underlying na-
ture (Gordon, et al., 2004; Jian and Wong, 
2004). Secondly, this is the first known study 
of RPTs and EM that focuses on Indonesia. 
Previous studies of RPTs and EM have looked 
at countries such as China (Jian and Wong, 
2004; Aharony, et al., 2005). Our study exam-
ines the different impact of using RPTs to 
manage earnings in emerging country of Indo-
nesia with different characteristics such as 
ownership structure, disclosure quality, inves-
tor protection, corporate government, and le-
gal enforcement. Furthermore, this research 
provides an overview on the actual RPTs in 
Indonesia and as an important basis for future 
research in Indonesian context.  
The remainder of this paper is organ-
ised as follows. The next section presents the 
theoretical framework underlying RPTs and 
EM linkage. Hypothesis is also provided in the 
next section. Section Three describes the re-
search design. Primary results including de-
scriptive statistics, correlations and regression 
analysis are presented in Section Four. Results 
of the study and implications for future re-
search are discussed in the concluding section. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The majority of the literature that seek 
to explain the incentives of managing earnings 
utilised agency theory. Agency theory is the 
major theory that serves as a basis for this re-
search and hypothesis development. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that agency con-
flict exists between the manager and share-
holder due to the separation of ownership and 
control. Agency theory focuses on the rela-
tionship9  between principal and agents (for 
example the relationship between shareholders 
and corporate managers), a relationship that 
created much uncertainty due to information 
asymmetry between two parties. The study of 
EM and RPTs presents an excellent opportuni-
ty to apply agency theory in a sense that there 
is conflict of interest and information asym-
metry between controlling and minority 
shareholders in Indonesian companies that fa-
cilitate the controlling shareholders to act in a 
self-interest way such as manage earnings for 
their own benefits. 
Furthermore, as implied by the media 
and standard setters, RPTs represent the po-
tential expropriation of the firm’s resources 
(Gordon and Henry, 2005)10. Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew (2004) propose that RPTs also raise 
concerns based on agency theory that manag-
ers will over consume perquisites (i.e. inap-
propriate wealth transfer) and alter the reliabil-
ity of financial statements thereby reducing 
the effectiveness of contracts designed to re-
duce agency conflicts and damages the firm’s 
stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The results of study conducted by Gordon, et 
al.(2004) also provide support for the view of 
RPTs as conflict of interest between manag-
ers/board members and their shareholders.  
There are several past studies that fo-
cus on the cost and benefits of corporate 
groups (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Fishman 
and Khanna, 1998; Claessens, et al., 2006). 
However, association between RPTs and EM 
is a relatively new topic in accounting re-
search. There are limited studies conducted on 
these issues and the results are mixed and far 
from conclusive. Carmichael (1999) proposes 
that there is a long history of revenue-
recognition manipulations involving related 
parties that are connected with fraudulent fi-
nancial reporting. The study conducted by Jian 
and Wong (2004) look into whether and how 
controlling shareholders use RPTs in EM and 
tunneling as well as the market response to 
such activities in China. It is found that the 
group-controlled firms report an abnormally 
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high level of RP sales when they have the in-
centives to inflate earnings in order to meet 
government requirements for the new equity 
offerings or to avoid delisting (Jian and Wong, 
2004). This study provides direct evidence on 
how large shareholders expropriate minority 
shareholders. In addition, Aharony et al.(2005) 
investigates RPTs as a means of EM and tun-
neling during IPO process in China. Their pa-
per contributes by providing empirical evi-
dence on earnings management using RPTs by 
examining RPTs patterns in both pre- and 
post-IPO periods and enhances understanding 
of the motives of earnings manipulation in the 
pre-IPO period.  
More recent study, such as Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al.(2006) suggests that when there is 
no or little scrutiny over RPTs, the manager 
has greater incentives to expropriate firm re-
sources and manage earnings. Cheng and 
Chen (2007) research of Chinese IPO firms, 
argue that there are two ways for IPO firms to 
manipulate pre-IPO reported earnings, by ma-
nipulating discretionary accruals and structur-
ing artificial operating RPTs (non-loan) with 
controlling shareholders. Gordon and Henry 
(2005) propose that if managers engage in 
RPTs to expropriate the firm’s resources, then 
they have the incentives to manage earnings to 
mask such expropriation. On the contrary, 
Gordon and Henry (2005) conclude that con-
cerns about RPTs are warranted but only for 
certain transactions and the mere presence of 
RPTs is not necessarily an indication that a 
firm is likely to engage in greater EM. 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) suggest that 
RPTs with investments appear to be associated 
with efficient contracting, while simple trans-
actions with directors, officers and sharehold-
ers are associated with opportunism. Accord-
ing to Duprey (2006), although most of the 
RPTs are legal, often these transactions were 
supposed to be conducted at arm’s length but 
ultimately benefited several of the principals 
involved. He also suggests that RPTs will be 
more prevalent in a family-owned and operated 
business. 
In brief, most of the studies conducted 
focus on RPTs with respect to EM on IPO pe-
riod and/or China. The majority of these stud-
ies suggest that there is empirical evidence 
that Chinese firms use RPTs as a means of 
EM and tunneling during IPO process. Given 
that there is no known prior study that utilise 
Indonesian data, this study seeks to provide a 
more comprehensive picture of RPTs and EM 
in Indonesian firms.  
Dye (1988) and Trueman, et al.(1988) 
show analytically that the existence of infor-
mation asymmetry between management and 
shareholders is a necessary condition for EM. 
Lobo and Zhou (2001) argue that in such envi-
ronment where shareholders they have less 
information than management and cannot per-
fectly observe a firm’s performance, manage-
ment can use its flexibility to manage reported 
earnings. 
In relation to concentrated ownership, 
McCahery and Vermeulen (2005) suggest that 
inefficient controlling shareholders have given 
rise to a huge variety of sophisticated tech-
niques to tunnel assets, profits and corporate 
opportunities. Fan and Wong (2002) propose 
that when ownership is concentrated to a level 
at which an owner obtains effective control of 
the firm, as the case in East Asia (like Indone-
sia11), the nature of the agency problem shifts 
away from manager-shareholder conflicts to 
conflicts between the controlling owner (who 
is also the manager) and minority shareholders. 
This view is further justified by the study con-
ducted by Lukviarman (2004) on Indonesian 
ownership structure and firm performance. 
Lukviarman (2004) finds that only a small 
proportion of private-domestic Indonesian 
firms have a widely dispersed ownership 
structure and the agency problem shifted to 
strong controlling shareholders and weak mi-
nority owners. Furthermore, the study propos-
es that inappropriate institutional, law and le-
gal enforcement insulate the controlling 
shareholders from external interference, moni-
toring and supervision. In another Indonesian 
study, Patrick (2002) suggests that Indonesian 
stock exchange, self-regulating institutions, 
and government oversight practice are not 
strong. Thus, highly concentrated and family-
based ownership structure leaves corporate 
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decisions in the hands of the controlling fami-
ly which might use RPTs to serve their own 
self-interested purpose.  
Accordingly, it can be inferred that In-
donesian country characteristics facilitates EM. 
Furthermore, agency theory suggests that 
company management as agent is driven by 
their self-interest in concentrated ownership 
company (controlling shareholder). Conse-
quently, this study conjecture that companies 
with perceived high level of RPTs might use 
the RPTs as a means to manipulate earnings 
for outright appropriation or to report unin-
formative earnings to avoid detection of their 
expropriation activities. Consistent with the 
agency theory and the above accounting litera-
ture review, the major hypothesis in this study 
proposes on: There is a positive association 
between RPTs in Indonesian publicly listed 
companies and level of EM. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Selection 
The projected sample of this study 
comprise of a sub-sample of 50 companies 
with equal proportion from manufacturing12 
and non-manufacturing industry13. The main 
criterion for selecting companies in the sample 
of this study was that they are listed on JSX14 
for two consecutive years of 2004 and 2005 
and disclosed RPTs in their annual reports and 
notes to financial statements. The stratified 
random sample is drawn from a mixture of 
companies from all types of industries. How-
ever, consistent with past studies, financial 
institutions (banks, insurance, unit trusts and 
finance firms) are excluded due to the nature 
of regulation and fundamental differences in 
the accrual generating process. A total of 100 
annual reports15 are collected and analysed. 
Prior empirical studies have also used annual 
reports in the investigation of RPTs and EM 
issues (Jian and Wong, 2004; Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew, 2004; Aharony, et al., 2005; Gordon 
and Henry, 2005). The data collected for the 
purpose of analysis are in Indonesian currency 
(IDR) to provide more accurate and compara-
ble information than otherwise might be due 
to the differences of exchange rates conversion.  
 
Proxy for Earnings Management and Re-
lated Party Transactions 
Prior to estimating discretionary accru-
als, total accruals (TAC) are calculated as: 
TACjt = (∆CAjt - ∆Cashjt) – (∆CLjt - ∆LTDjt  
 - ∆ITPjt) - DPAjt {1} 
Where: 
TACjt = total accruals for firm j in time period t 
∆CAjt  = change current assets for firm j 
from time period t-1 to t 
∆Cashjt  = change cash balance for firm j from 
time period t-1 to t 
∆CLjt = change current liabilities for firm j 
from time period t-1 to t 
∆LTDjt = change long-term debt included in 
current liabilities for firm j from 
time period t-1 to t 
 ∆ITPjt = change income tax payable for firm 
j from time period t-1 to t 
DPAjt  = depreciation and amortisation ex-
pense for firm j from time period to t. 
TAC then is decomposed into normal accruals 
(NAC) and discretionary accruals (DAC) using 
the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) 
model defined formally as: 
[ ]
[ ]
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α
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Where: 
TAC jk,t  = total accruals for firm j in industry 
k in year t 
TAjk,t-1  = are total assets for firm j in indus-
try k at the end of year t-1 
∆REVjk,t = change net sales for firm j in indus-
try k between years t-1 and t 
∆RECjk,t = change in receivables for firm j in 
industry k between years t-1 and t 
PPEjk,t  = gross property, plant and equip-
ment for firm j in industry k in the 
year t 
αj, βj, γj  = industry specific estimated coeffi-
cients 
εj  = error term. 
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NAC is defined as the fitted values 
from Eq. 2 whilst DAC is the residual (TAC 
minus NAC). Schipper (1989) and Aharony et 
al.(2005) classify RPTs as real means of EM 
(timing investment or financing decision to 
alter reported earnings). RPTs include items 
such as sales and purchases of product and 
materials, borrowing and lending, interests, 
rents, purchase and sales commissions, and 
exchange of fixed assets. Gordon et al.(2004) 
measures RP in term of the parties, type of 
transactions, and transaction dollar amount. In 
their research, Jian and Wong (2004) utilise 
RP sales for it recurring nature (determine 
normality and abnormality level of RPTs) and 
RP purchases in the sensitivity analysis. 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2004) analyse the 
types and nature of RPTs (simple and com-
plex). On the other hand, Aharony et al.(2005) 
uses changes of sales of goods and services 
and changes of net credit in their study. Fur-
thermore, Gordon and Henry (2005) draw on 
the total number of different RPTs, RPTs by 
different parties, the amount disclosed and the 
complexity. The more recent study conducted 
by Cheng and Chen (2007) tests the associa-
tion between EM and RPTs with operating 
RPTs (non-loan) and loan RPTs. There are 
different measurements utilised in previous 
empirical research. In the main analysis of this 
study, the absolute amounts of RPTs in IDR in 
the annual reports are used. Alternative 
measures of RPTs such as number of types of 
RPTs and RP sales are utilised in additional 
sensitivity analysis.  
 
Control Variables Proxies 
In the regression, some variables are 
included to control for other factors found to 
be associated with EM. Similar with previous 
research (Dechow, 1994; Klein, 2002; Jian 
and Wong, 2004; Gordon and Henry, 2005; 
Rusmin, 2006) several control variables is in-
troduced, such as Cash Flow from Operation 
(CFO), Leverage, Return on Assets (ROA), 
Firm Size and Big-4 audit firms (BIG-4). Gor-
don and Henry (2005) similar with Aharony et 
al.(2005) used operating cash flow (CFO) as 
an indicator variable for negative earnings to 
control for other properties of earnings and 
accruals. Dechow (1994) and Kasznik (1999) 
propose that accruals are negatively correlated 
with operating cash flow. Thus a control vari-
able of CFO is incorporated to control for dis-
cretionary accruals correlation with operating 
cash flow. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find 
that that leverage is positively associated with 
EM. Leverage ratio is incorporated as a con-
trol variable since this variable may in part 
capture the value of corporate tax shield (Jian 
and Wong, 2004). Previous research (Dechow, 
et al., 1995; Frankel,  et al., 2002) report that 
DAC is also dependent on a firm’s financial 
performance because it may affect corporate 
management’s opportunistic window and in-
centives for managing earnings (Krishnan, 
2003). In addition, McNichols (2000) argues 
that accruals, estimated nondiscretionary ac-
cruals and discretionary accruals are signifi-
cantly positively correlated with ROA. There-
fore, this study utilises ROA as one of the con-
trol variables. In addition, firm size has been 
used in previous studies as a control for firm’s 
growth opportunities. Gordon and Henry 
(2005) suggest that size is included as control 
variable because political costs are negatively 
associated with EM. The final control variable 
included is Big-4 audit firms. Prior research 
usually distinguishes between non Big-4 and 
Big-4 audit firms arguing the latter to be of a 
higher quality than the former (Mayhew and 
Wilkins, 2003). Proxy measures for dependent, 
independent and control variables are defined 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Variables Definition and Description 
Variables Title Variable Description 
Dependent Variable 
Absolute DAC 
Absolute DAC’s firm i for year t measured by modified Jones 
(1991) model 
Independent Variable 
Lagged total amounts of RPTs 
Absolute value of total RPTs divided by total assets for firm i for 
year t-1 
Control Variables 
Cash Flow (CFO) 
Cash flow from operations for firm i during the year t deflated by 
total assets as at end of year t-1 
Leverage  Ratio of book value of total liabilities of firm i for year t to book 
value of total assets of firm i for year t  
Return on Asset (ROA) Ratio of net income of firm i for year t to book value of total as-
sets of firm i for year t 
Firm Size  Natural logarithm of total book value of assets of firm i for year t 
Big-4 Audit Firms (BIG-4) Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if their incumbent 
auditor in fiscal year t is a Big-4 firm; otherwise scored zero (0) 
 
Empirical Model Equation 
This study uses Ordinary Least Square 
multiple regression as the main statistical 
technique to test the hypothesis. The main re-
gression model is defined in the following 
equation: 
DAC
i,t  
= b
0 
+ b
1
RPTs
i,t 
+ b
2
CFO
i,t  
  
+ b
3
Leverage
i,t 
+ b
4
ROA
i,t  
  
+ b
5
Firm Size
i,t 
+ b
6
BIG-4 
i,t 
  
+ e
i,t
.      
 
Where:  
DAC  = estimated discretionary accruals 
calculated by the modified Jones 
(1991) model 
RPTs  = firm i’s absolute value of total 
RPTs divided by total assets for 
firm i for year t-1 
CFO  = cash flow from operation scaled 
by total assets 
Leverage = firm i’s total liabilities divided by 
total assets 
ROA  = ratio of net income of firm i for 
year t to book value of total assets 
of firm i for year t 
Firm Size = natural logarithm of total assets at 
year end t 
bi  = regression coefficients 
e  = regression residual or error term 
i   = company indicator. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Gordon and Henry (2005) identified 
seven main types of RPTs such as direct ser-
vices, purchases of goods or contract services, 
sales to related parties, loans to related parties, 
fixed-rate financing from related parties, in-
vestments and other. According to PSAK No.7, 
firms should disclose the nature of the rela-
tionships, the RPTs16, as well as information 
about the transactions and outstanding balanc-
es necessary for understanding potential effect 
of the relationship on the financial statements 
(Indonesian Institute of Accountants, 1994). 
Similar to past research, the RPTs dis-
closed in the study sample data are quite di-
verse. For the purpose of descriptive analysis, 
total values of RPTs are modified in several 
ways. Firstly, the values of all RPTs are ag-
gregated (total amount of RPTs)17. Then, the 
RPTs are categorized into the class of the 
transactions as appear in balance sheet and 
profit and loss statements18. Furthermore, only 
the major recurring RPTs are analysed. Table 
2 presents the basic descriptive statistics from 
100 observations and broken down by industry 
type (manufacturing and non-manufacturing) 
and financial period (period ended 2005 and 
2004).  
 
 JAAI VOLUME 14 NO. 2, DESEMBER 2010: 115–93  
122 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of RPTs 
VARIABLE 
DESCRIPTION MEAN MEDIAN 
STD 
DEVIATION MIN MAX 
AVERAGE 
(%) 
Total amount of RPTs 523,569,398 59,307,737 1,227,592,820 135,399 7,652,218,000  
Manufacturing 371,647,264 82,651,218 582,312,384 135,399 2,462,976,419  
Non-manufacturing 675,491,533 55,696,615 1,630,500,723 793,604 7,652,218,000  
Year ended 2005 557,616,863 64,938,747 1,252,079,292 135,399 7,149,399,000  
Year ended 2004 489,521,934 59,307,737 1,214,353,621 812,083 7,652,218,000  
All financial statements accounts 
Total assets 139,747,947 14,439,104 506,902,260 0 3,539,082,000 41.46% 
Manufacturing 54,507,014 25,996,778 65,999,787 0 260,535,536 
Non-manufacturing 224,988,881 13,718,219 707,077,860 0 3,539,082,000 
Year ended 2005 148,281,710 14,439,104 524,129,139 0 3,539,082,000 
Year ended 2004 131,214,185 14,928,428 494,250,645 0 3,296,102,000 
       
Total liabilities 95,239,822 5,034,347 259,582,722 0 1,514,563,000 23.47% 
Manufacturing 67,642,379 10,125,202 212,658,252 0 1,482,474,502 
Non-manufacturing 122,837,264 3,962,500 298,937,601 0 1,514,563,000 
Year ended 2005 102,559,136 5,627,016 276,858,961 0 1,482,474,502 
Year ended 2004 87,920,507 4,832,286 243,682,848 0 1,514,563,000 
       
Total revenues 109,776,706 1,990,446 268,241,202 0 1,701,621,000 19.82% 
Manufacturing 141,230,330 12,621,831 230,886,814 0 947,607,669 
Non-manufacturing 78,323,082 103,500 300,078,919 0 1,701,621,000 
Year ended 2005 119,007,472 1,978,174 268,760,687 0 1,312,829,000 
Year ended 2004 100,545,940 2,115,895 270,127,602 0 1,701,621,000 
       
Total expenses 178,804,923 150,000 540,304,573 0 3,695,644,843 15.25% 
Manufacturing 108,267,542 112,493 257,592,244 0 1,198,907,301 
Non-manufacturing 249,342,305 1,001,518 716,455,098 0 3,695,644,843 
Year ended 2005 187,768,544 159,404 584,449,729 0 3,695,644,843 
Year ended 2004 169,841,303 127,766 498,066,602 0 2,975,608,590 
Total (%tage)      100.00% 
Legend: Data of RPTs are in thousands of IDR. Total amount of RPTs is the aggregate amounts of all related par-
ties transactions disclosed by sample firms. This amount is further sub classified as assets, liabilities, rev-
enues and expenses. All values are in thousands of IDR. Average percentage from total amount is the 
proportion of each sub class of RPTs amount as a percentage of total RPTs amount. 
 
As presented in Table 2, average total 
amount of RPTs from the 100 observations is 
523,569,398 thousands IDR. The average total 
amounts for manufacturing firms is considera-
bly lower than that of non-manufacturing 
firms. This amount accounted approximately 
half as much as total RPTs amount of non-
manufacturing firm. However, there is only 
slight increase of 13.91% from 2004 
(489,521,934 thousands IDR) to 2005 
(557,616,863 thousands IDR). The second part 
of the Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of 
RP assets, RP liabilities, RP revenues and RP 
expenses19. On average, RP assets are 7.81% 
of company’s total assets, RP liabilities are 
9.24% of company’s total liabilities and RP 
revenues are 8.70% of company’s net sales. In 
addition, the averages value of both total RP 
assets (54,507,014 thousands IDR) and RP 
liabilities (67,642,379 thousands IDR) are 
lower for manufacturing firms. Non-
manufacturing firms’ total RP assets and total 
RP liabilities are correspondingly 75.77% and 
44.93% higher. However, manufacturing 
firms’ revenues from related parties 
(141,230,330 thousands IDR) account twice as 
much as those of non-manufacturing firms 
(78,323,082 thousands IDR). Furthermore, the 
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results from the descriptive statistics suggest 
that RP assets transactions on average made 
up approximately 41.46% of the total amount 
of RPTs. This transaction is the highest in val-
ue followed by RP liabilities transaction 
(23%.47), RP revenues transaction (19.82%) 
and RP expenses transaction (15.25%). There 
are limited studies on EM and these studies 
utilise different measure of RPTs. There is no 
known prior study that classifies RPTs into 
assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses for the 
purpose of descriptive. The results are thus not 
comparable. However, the results from de-
scriptive statistics might suggest that Indone-
sian firms provide more RP lending than RP 
borrowing (RP assets greater than RP liabili-
ties). Table 3 presents the basic descriptive 
statistics for the major accounts for 100 obser-
vations and the specification by financial peri-
od20.  
The accounts receivables and due from 
related parties on average accounted 10.31% 
and 12.26% respectively from 41.46% of total 
RP asset transactions. The remaining of this 
proportion is other assets21 of 18.89%. On av-
erage, the RP liabilities transaction is 23.47% 
of the total amount of RPTs. This 23.47% can 
be traced to approximately 5.12% of RP ac-
counts payable transactions and 9.66% of due 
to related parties. Other liabilities22 accounted 
8.69% of total amount of RPTs. On average, 
other expenses23 and other revenues accounted 
3.44% and 1.55 % respectively.  
 
Table 3: RPTs Classified by Major Accounts24 
VARIABLE 
DESCRIPTION MEAN MEDIAN 
STD 
DEVIATION MAX 
AVERAGE % FROM 
TOTAL AMOUNT 
ASSETS      
Accounts receivable 26,784,887 3,251,217 54,018,983 322,669,000 10.31% 
  Year ended 2005 29,841,598 3,088,490 55,838,862 260,535,536 
  Year ended 2004 23,728,175 3,251,217 52,522,436 322,669,000 
Due from RP 24,157,712 951,453 109,503,214 794,518,634 12.26% 
  Year ended 2005 24,150,152 776,468 112,565,075 794,518,634 
  Year ended 2004 24,165,271 1,249,904 107,497,557 759,543,611 
Other assets 88,805,349 681,729 445,301,452 3,332,282,000 18.89% 
LIABILITIES      
Accounts payables 28,655,810 38,887 85,448,468 550,152,384 5.12% 
  Year ended 2005 29,024,994 187,516 88,451,250 550,152,384 
  Year ended 2004 28,286,625 22,000 83,234,539 490,867,794 
Due to RP 8,100,049 59,703 27,153,073 177,616,017 9.66% 
  Year ended 2005 3,424,498 0 8,736,763 53,438,043 
  Year ended 2004 12,775,599 180,713 36,995,684 177,616,017 
Other liabilities 58,483,963 0 245,727,211 1,474,500,000 8.69% 
REVENUES      
Sales to RP 108,369,928 667,653 265,987,904 1,739,965,000 18.27% 
  Year ended 2005 115,831,499 848,200 259,451,431 1,242,222,000 
  Year ended 2004 100,908,357 397,721 274,798,710 1,739,965,000 
Other sales 1,406,809 0 10,647,516 70,607,000 1.55% 
EXPENSES      
Purchases from RP 151,413,336 0 521,387,952 3,692,233,334 11.81% 
  Year ended 2005 159,303,766 0 566,181,078 3,692,233,334 
  Year ended 2004 143,522,907 0 478,069,644 2,972,197,081 
Other expenses 27,391,587 0 164,860,002 1,205,993,000 3.44% 
TOTAL (%TAGE)     100.00% 
Legend: Total asset can be further traced to RP accounts receivables transactions and due from related parties. Total 
liabilities can be further traced to RP accounts payables transactions and due to related parties. The major 
account that constitutes revenue is sales revenue from goods and services to related parties. The major ac-
count that constitutes expenses is purchases of raw materials from related parties. Average percentage from 
total amount is the proportion of each class of RPTs amount as a percentage of total RPTs amount. 
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This study finds that on average, sales 
to RP alone accounted 18.27% of the total 
amount of RPTs disclosed by companies. De-
scriptive statistics results suggest that sales to 
RP is higher than purchase from RP (11.81%). 
The finding is different from those of past 
studies on IPO firms (Jian and Wong, 2004; 
Aharony et al., 2005) which suggest that RP 
sales25 are lower than RP purchases. However, 
their studies focus on IPO period that might 
induce tunneling26 behaviour from IPO firms 
to parent companies post-IPO, while this study 
focuses on non-IPO period. Interestingly, this 
study is in line with past studies (Jian and 
Wong, 2004; Aharony, et al., 2005) in term of 
higher RP receivables (accounts receivable 
and due from RP) of 22.57% compared to RP 
payables (accounts payable and due to RP) of 
14.78%. Following the suggestions by Jian 
and Wong (2004), there are two possible ex-
planations of this result. The first explanation 
is that firms may have more assurance in the 
collection of credit provided based on the sta-
ble and long-term relationships developed 
among group members, thus offer larger 
amounts of credit to affiliated firms. The other 
possible explanation is that credit offering can 
be employed as a tool for tunneling by lending 
more and borrowing less from RP. However, 
it is beyond the scope of this study to investi-
gate tunneling behaviour of Indonesian firms 
and this issue may be an interesting topic for 
future research.  
Gordon and Henry (2005) argue that 
the more parties and more types of RPTs indi-
cate extensive and pervasive potential con-
flicts of interest and monitoring issues implied 
by agency theory. The number of different 
types of RPTs disclosed ranges from 1 to 21. 
On average, these Indonesian firms have 5.51 
out of all different types with a median of 5 
and standard deviation of 3.75. This result is 
higher compared to other study, Gordon and 
Henry (2005) find that on average, U.S. com-
panies have 2.19 RPTs types with a median of 
2 and standard deviation of 1.71 out of the 18 
different types they identified27. The differ-
ences might be the result of different sample 
data utilised, developed economies (U.S. firms) 
relative to developing economies (Indonesian 
firms). Furthermore, variation in the way of 
classifying types of RPTs may influence the 
comparability of the results. Table 4 presents 
the descriptive statistics for the study’s de-
pendent and control variables.  
As shown in this table, the average 
discretionary accruals (DAC) are 11.78% of 
total assets at the beginning of the year. The 
value is far higher when compared to the aver-
age DAC reported in Australia of -0.9% 
(Rusmin, 2006). Furthermore, this average 
also differs when compared to other Asian 
countries like Singapore (2.69% of total assets) 
(Rusmin, 2006) and (7.9% of total assets)28 
China (Cheng and Chen, 2007). The higher 
mean DAC is consistent with recent interna-
tional comparative study by Leuz, et al.(2003) 
which suggests that EM is more pervasive in 
newly developed and emerging countries with 
relatively concentrated ownership, weak in-
vestor protection and less developed stock 
market. The distribution of absolute DAC is 
quite varied. The number of firms having posi-
tive and negative DAC is almost equal with 45 
firms and 55 firms respectively. This approx-
imately equal proportion of observations with 
positive and negative DAC is consistent with 
other research (Klein, 2002; Rusmin, 2006; 
Rusmin, et al., 2006). The almost equal pro-
portions thus do not provide evidence of sys-
tematic upward or downward earnings man-
agement activity. It is likely that the sample 
data is relatively random with respect to earn-
ings management incentives (Healy and Wah-
len, 1999; Klein, 2002). 
The average DAC in 2004 (8.82%) is 
lower than that of 2005 (14.73%). T-test re-
sults suggest that there is significant difference 
of mean DAC between these two periods 
(p<0.05). The changes of the DAC of Indone-
sian firms are in similar direction with the 
changes of ROA. Average firms’ ROA is 
higher for period ended 2005 (7.76%) com-
pared to those for the period ended 2004 
(5.75%). Kaznik (1999) argues that DAC es-
timates are correlated with earnings perfor-
mance. Moreover, McNichols (2000) also 
proposes that DAC estimates are significantly 
Related Party Transactions … (Linvani Kuan, et al.) 
125 
positively associated with ROA. The DAC 
between manufacturing firms and non manu-
facturing firms also differ significantly (t-test, 
p<0.01) 29  with 17.24% of total assets and 
6.31% of total assets respectively. Descriptive 
statistics results suggest that the average size 
of non-manufacturing firm are considerably 
greater than manufacturing firms. The plausi-
ble explanation is that larger firms are subject 
to more extensive political scrutiny compared 
to smaller firms (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) 
thus reduces the ability to manage earnings 
using DAC30. In addition, perhaps the regula-
tory environment and accounting regulations 
might be different which allows greater use of 
DAC by manufacturing firms. 
 
Table 4: Dependent and Control Variables’ Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE 
DESCRIPTION MEAN MEDIAN 
STD 
DEVIATION MIN MAX 
Dependent variable      
Absolute DAC 0.1178 0.0762 0.1449 0.0014 0.8499 
  Manufacturing 0.1724 0.1146 0.1853 0.0060 0.8499 
  Non-manufacturing 0.0631 0.0587 0.0448 0.0014 0.1965 
  Year ended 2005 0.1473 0.0869 0.1760 0.0014 0.8499 
  Year ended 2004 0.0882 0.0707 0.0983 0.0020 0.6089 
  Positive DAC (%) 45%     
  Negative DAC (%) 55%     
Control Variables      
Firm Size 1,789,407,453 559,630,076 4,517,398,266 35,583,366 32,787,133,000 
  Manufacturing 1,086,393,454 460,939,560 1,958,676,817 73,907,068 10,536,379,744 
  Non-manufacturing 2,492,421,452 660,973,502 6,032,014,293 35,583,366 32,787,133,000 
  Year ended 2005 1,940,161,939 585,220,840 4,904,056,221 61,347,659 32,787,133,000 
  Year ended 2004 1,638,652,967 518,227,015 4,139,334,776 35,583,366 27,872,467,000 
       
Leverage 0.5787 0.5409 0.3533 0.0449 2.2409 
  Manufacturing 0.6465 0.5440 0.4552 0.0475 2.2409 
  Non-manufacturing 0.5109 0.5409 0.1886 0.0449 0.8254 
  Year ended 2005 0.5587 0.5409 0.3416 0.0449 2.2409 
  year ended 2004 0.5987 0.5392 0.3669 0.0596 2.1848 
       
ROA 0.0676 0.0646 0.0963 -0.2791 0.4049 
  Manufacturing 0.0617 0.0392 0.1179 -0.2791 0.4049 
  Non-manufacturing 0.0735 0.0686 0.0691 -0.0919 0.2105 
  Year ended 2005 0.0776 0.0680 0.0782 -0.0519 0.3856 
  Year ended 2004 0.0575 0.0424 0.1114 -0.2791 0.4049 
       
CFO 0.0474 0.0477 0.1202 -0.3855 0.3537 
  Manufacturing 0.0377 0.0327 0.0996 -0.2489 0.2766 
  Non-manufacturing 0.0571 0.0643 0.1382 -0.3855 0.3537 
  Year ended 2005 0.0559 0.0625 0.1196 -0.3855 0.3007 
  Year ended 2004 0.0389 0.0288 0.1215 -0.2508 0.3537 
       
Auditor type (%)      
  Big-4 35%     
  Non Big-4 65%     
Legend: Absolute DAC are the absolute value of DAC determined using Modified Jones (1991) Model. Positive 
(Negative) DAC and Big-4 (Non Big-4) are dichotomous variables. Firm Size: firm i firm’s total assets in 
year t. Leverage: firm i total liabilities in year t scaled by total asset in year t. ROA: firm i net income in 
year t divided by total assets in year t. CFO: ratio of firm i CFO in year t scaled by total asset in year t-1. 
Auditor: Big-4 auditors are PWC, EY, KPMG and DT. 
As listed in Table 4, the five control 
variables utilised in the analysis are Firm Size, 
Leverage, ROA, CFO and Big-4 audit firms. 
Table 4 indicates that the average firm size 
(measured by the total asset) is 1.789.407.453 
thousands IDR. Average leverage in Indone-
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sian firms is around 57.87 %. This is higher 
than those of Australian firms of 44.8% (Da-
vidson, et al., 2005) and those of seven East 
Asian economies of 46.83% (Fan and Wong, 
2002). This high leverage level in Indonesia is 
consistent with the past study conducted by the 
Central Bank of Chile (2004) that suggests that 
Indonesia is one the highest leveraged Asian 
countries with 35.3% debt-to-equity ratio. 
Chavalier, et al.(2006) propose that the high 
leverage is facilitated by the related-bank credit 
behaviour in Indonesia where firms can easily 
access short-term borrowing without enough 
collateral and some business group (conglom-
erates) were allowed to establish their own 
commercial banks to serve the needs of other 
corporations within the group. 
As reported in Table 4, average ROA 
is 6.76% (7.76% for period ended 2005 and 
5.75% for the period ended 2004). The aver-
age ROA is higher than the ROA of another 
Indonesian study (2.00%) conducted by Nur-
hayati, et al.(2006)31. The difference might be 
a result of Indonesia is ongoing recovery from 
the effects of economic crisis that hit the coun-
try in mid 1997. In addition, the ROA figure is 
slightly higher than the average ROA from a 
similar study of Chinese firms of 5.73% (Jian 
and Wong, 2004). Furthermore, the distribu-
tion of the Big-4 and non Big-4 auditor in 
sample companies are 35 % and 65%32 respec-
tively. This percentage is quite low compared 
to Rusmin et al. (2006) study of Singaporean 
firms which indicate that 86.57% of the sam-
ple data is audited by Big-4 audit firms. Re-
sults of chi-square goodness of fit test suggest 
that the choice of Big-4 and non Big-4 audi-
tors are not uniformly distributed (p<0.01). 
The lower percentage for Big-4 auditors could 
reflect the point that Indonesian market could 
be different from developed markets such as 
U.S. and Australia. There are 156 accounting 
firms registered with BAPEPAM at June 2001 
consists of Big-533 audit firms, 20 affiliates of 
other international firms and 131 local audit 
firms (Tas-Anvaripour and Reid, 2002). In 
Indonesia, local audit firms might have estab-
lished their market share and have a good rela-
tionship with local firms. In addition, despite 
the fact that Big-4 audit firms have numerous 
international clients, local audit firms might be 
better in offering more localised services with 
better insights into local trends and regulatory 
issues.34 The last control variable is CFO with 
an average of 4.7% with non manufacturing 
firm’s CFO (5.71%) slightly higher than that 
of manufacturing firms (3.77%). However, 
independent sample t-test results suggest that 
there is no significant difference (t-test, 
p>0.10) of CFO between manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 5 presents a correlation matrix 
between the dependent, independent and con-
trol variables. The upper half of the each panel 
reports Pearson pairwise correlation coeffi-
cients (crp), whereas the lower half is Spearman 
correlation coefficients (crs). Correlation results 
do not support the hypothesis. Although, the 
absolute DAC is negatively correlated with the 
total amount of RPTs, the correlation is not 
significant. In regard to correlations between 
independent and control variables, and amongst 
control variables themselves, significant corre-
lations are reported in the correlation matrix. 
The highest correlation is between the ROA 
and CFO, with a correlation of 0.425. All the 
value of the significant correlation are below 
the critical limit of 0.80 (Cooper and Schindler, 
2003), suggesting any multicollinearity prob-
lem between the variables is not a serious con-
cern in the model estimation.  
 
Univariate Results 
This section outlines the univariate 
analysis between the DAC with various types 
of RPTs and between DAC with the control 
variables. Table 6 reports the independent 
sample t-test results35 between absolute DAC 
and the control variables. 
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Table 5: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrix 
 
DAC LAGGED TOTAL AMOUNT 
FIRM 
SIZE LEVERAGE ROA BIG-4 CFO 
DAC  -0.031 0.040 -0.024 0.052 0.010 -0.033 
Lagged RPTs -0.057  0.034 0.082 0.047 -0.032 -0.173 
Firm Size -0.002 0.101  0.153 0.080 0.232** 0.183 
Leverage -0.044 0.220** 0.291*  -0.282* 0.108 -0.196 
ROA -0.075 0.241** 0.205** -0.152  0.187 0.316* 
BIG-4 -0.074 -0.004 0.289* 0.184 0.269*  0.197** 
CFO -0.045 0.044 0.159 -0.297* 0.425* 0.222**  
Legend: *, ** and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively (based 
on two tailed tests).  
 
Table 6: Independent Sample T-test of DAC with Control Variables 
 N 
MEAN 
ABSOLUTE 
DAC 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE 
T-STATS 
(TWO-
TAILED) 
MANN-
WHITNEY U SIG. 
(TWO-TAILED) 
Industry types           
  Manufacturing 50 0.1724 0.1092 0.0000* 0.0000* 
  Non-manufacturing 50 0.0631       
Audit firm      
  Big-4 35 0.1197 -0.0030 0.9210 0.4630 
  Non Big-4 65 0.1167       
Firm size      
  Large 50 0.1255 -0.0155 0.5960 0.9780 
  Small 50 0.1100       
Firm Profitability      
  Positive ROA 81 0.1236 -0.0351 0.4110 0.8500 
  Negative ROA 19 0.0930       
Legend: *, ** and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p <0.05 and p<0.10 respectively (based on two tailed tests). 
The results are consistent with Mann-Whitney U non parametric test. Industry type: firm i is defined as 
manufacturing if manufacturing firms; otherwise defined as non-manufacturing. Audit firm: firm i is de-
fined as Big-4 if it incumbent auditor is either PWC, KPMG, EY or DT; otherwise defined as non Big-4. 
Firm Size: firm i is defined as large if it has above median value of logarithm total assets (20.1426) for the 
100 observations; otherwise defined as small firm. Firm Profitability: firm i is defined as positive ROA if 
the ROA is positive; otherwise defined as negative ROA. 
 
Prior research suggests some specific 
characteristics might influence the magnitude 
of EM. The results suggest that there is signif-
icant difference (p<0.01) of mean values of 
DAC on manufacturing and non manufactur-
ing firms. This finding is consistent with pre-
vious studies on Australian data (Godfrey and 
Koh, 1998; Rusmin, 2006) who find that the 
mean absolute DAC is higher for manufactur-
ing firm. Several studies (Krishnan, 2003; 
Francis, et al., 2005) suggest that Big-4 audi-
tors have better quality than non Big-4 audi-
tors and clients of Big-4 audit firms on aver-
age report lower DAC than those of non Big-4 
clients. However, the result of independent 
sample t-test in Table 6 suggests that there is 
no difference in mean DAC between Big-4 
and non Big-4 audited firms. Watts and Zim-
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merman (1990) propose that large firms man-
age their earnings down more actively to min-
imise political scrutiny. However, the findings 
in this study are consistent with previous re-
search by Reynolds and Francis (2001) and 
Chung and Kallapur (2003), t-test results sug-
gests that there is no significant difference in 
means between large and small firms. Unlike 
Rusmin (2006) results using Australian data, 
the t-test result in Table 6 suggests that there 
is no significant difference in mean DAC be-
tween poor performing companies (Negative 
ROA) and good performing companies (Posi-
tive ROA). 
Table 7 provides the results of inde-
pendent sample t-test between absolute DAC 
and various types of RPTs. The t-test results 
between RP asset accounts (accounts receiva-
bles and due from related parties), RP pur-
chases and RP net asset36 accounts with DAC 
indicate that there is no significant mean dif-
ference. However, both RP liabilities transac-
tions (accounts payables and due to related 
parties) suggest a highly significant mean dif-
ferences (p<0.05). On the contrary to t-test 
results, Mann-Whitney U tests indicate that 
there is significance (p<0.1) mean difference 
between DAC and Sales to RP.  
 
Table 7: Independent Sample T-test of DAC with Major RPTs 
 N 
MEAN 
ABSOLUTE 
DAC 
MEAN 
DIFFERENCE 
T-STATS 
(TWO-
TAILED) 
MANN-WHITNEY 
U SIG. (TWO-
TAILED) 
Accounts receivables      
  No account receivables 26 0.1251 0.0099 0.7650 0.9250 
  With account receivables 74 0.1152       
Due from RP      
  No due from RP 41 0.1438 0.0441 0.1770 0.3490 
  With due from RP 59 0.0997       
Accounts payables      
  No account payables 48 0.1567 0.0748 0.0120* 0.0120* 
  With account payables 52 0.0818       
Due to RP      
  No due to RP 50 0.1575 0.0795 0.0060* 0.0580* 
  With due to RP 50 0.0780       
Sales      
  No sales to RP 44 0.1050 -0.2281 0.4370 0.1870* 
  With sales to RP 56 0.1278       
Purchases      
  No purchases from RP 58 0.1339 0.0384 0.1930 0.3490 
  With purchases from RP 42 0.0955       
RP Net Asset      
  Positive RP net asset 63 0.1281 -0.0280 0.2670 0.4690 
  Negative RP net asset 37 0.1001       
Legend: *, ** and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p <0.05 and p<0.10 respectively (two tailed tests). The re-
sults are consistent with Mann-Whitney U non parametric test. Accounts receivable, due from related par-
ties, accounts payables, due to related parties, sales, and purchase: firm i is defined as no such transac-
tion if there is no such related parties transactions disclosed in annual reports; otherwise defined as with 
each transactions. RP Net asset: firm i is defined as positive RP Net asset firm if the disclosed RP total 
assets exceed RP total liabilities; otherwise defined as negative RP Net asset. 
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Multivariate Main Results 
 
Table 8: Multiple Regression Results37 
MODEL SUMMARY 
R-square 0.111 
Adjusted R-square 0.047 
ANOVA sig. value 0.121 
Coefficients Beta t-statistics sig. 
Constant  1.582 0.117 
Lagged total amount of RPTs -0.013 -0.123 0.902 
Firm Size -0.038 -0.346 0.730 
Leverage -0.247 -2.209 0.300 
ROA -0.134 -1.198 0.234 
Big-4 -0.148 -1.345 0.182 
CFO 0.113 0.964 0.338 
Legend: *, ** and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively (based on two tailed tests). 
Refer to Table 3.3 for full definition and descriptions of the dependent, independent and control variables. 
Lagged total amount of RPTs: total amount of RPTs scaled by total assets year t-1.  
 
A total of 50 companies for two years 
(100 observations) are included in this regres-
sion. The main results for testing the hypothe-
sis are reported in Table 8. The initial regres-
sion shows that only 11.10% of the variation 
of absolute DAC is explained by the inde-
pendent variable and control variables. The 
ANOVA significant value (0.121) shows that 
the overall model is not significant. Further-
more, the p-values indicate that the independ-
ent variables and control variables are not a 
significant predictor of EM in Indonesian pub-
licly listed companies. Thus, the result sug-
gests that total amount of RPTs in firms is not 
a significant predictor of the existence of EM 
measured by absolute DAC. This finding is 
contrary to the expectations formed based on 
review of past literature that suggest RPTs 
raising the issues of agency conflict of interest 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), represent poten-
tial expropriation of the firm’s resources 
(Gordon and Henry, 2005), and alter the relia-
bility of financial statements (Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew, 2004). In addition, the results do not 
provide support for the view of RPTs as con-
flict of interest between managers or board 
members and shareholders proposed by Gor-
don et al.(2004). All the control variables are 
statistically insignificant in the multiple re-
gression analysis.  
 
Multivariate Results for Partitioned Sub-
samples 
This section discusses multiple regres-
sion analysis for partitioned sub-samples 
based on DAC sign, firm size and industry 
type. Past studies (Frankel, et al., 2002; Chung 
and Kallapur, 2003) suggest that income-
incentives may produce different EM behav-
iour. In addition, other studies (Reynolds and 
Francis, 2001; Rusmin, 2006) suggest that 
firm size may influence the magnitude of EM. 
Moreover, we also analyse the sub-samples of 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms 
due to the mean absolute DAC of those sub-
groups are significantly different (t-test, 
p<0.01). The multiple regression results for 
the sub-samples (for brevity, the regression 
table is not included) are similar with those of 
the initial regression. 
 
Additional Sensitivity and Robustness 
Checks 
We perform additional sensitivity and 
robustness checks to further ensure the infer-
ences drawn thus far are valid. First, despite 
the fact that modified Jones (1991) model is a 
widely accepted model and perhaps the best 
alternative currently available to test for EM, 
the model is not free from criticism. To ad-
dress this concern, sensitivity analysis use al-
ternative models (e.g. cross-sectional variation 
Related Party Transactions … (Linvani Kuan, et al.) 
129 
of modified Jones (1991) with the ROA and 
CFO and original Jones (1991) model). Se-
cond, past related studies utilise different 
measures of RPTs. Aharony, et al.(2005) use 
the changes of sales of goods and services and 
changes of net credit to measure RPTs. On the 
other hand, Jian and Wong (2004) use RP 
sales transactions and RP purchase transac-
tions. This study therefore applies two alterna-
tive measures of RPTs. Gordon and Henry 
(2005) suggests that the more parties and 
types of transactions indicate extensive and 
pervasive potential conflicts of interest and 
monitoring issues. Thus, the first alternative 
uses the number of types of transactions dis-
closed by firms. The second alternative is con-
sistent with Jian and Wong (2004) that use RP 
sales transaction because it is the most signifi-
cant recurring transactions that have direct 
impact on EM. All findings from use of alter-
native measures of EM and RPTs do not fa-
cilitate any significant qualitative change in 
results as reported in Table 8. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
Based on the results of all analyses 
conducted, this study generally finds no em-
pirical evidence on the existence of relation-
ship between RPTs and EM in Indonesian 
companies. The results of this study are differ-
ent from majority of past studies (Jian and 
Wong, 2004; Aharony, et al., 2005; Cheng and 
Chen, 2007) in term of the absence of empiri-
cal evidence to suggest that RPTs is associated 
with EM. 
There are several feasible reasons for 
the contradiction with agency theory tenets 
and insignificant relationship between RPTs 
and EM in Indonesian context as found in this 
study. The first reason may be consistent with 
the alternative views on RPTs, contracting 
theory suggesting that RPTs can be part of ef-
ficient contracting with related parties 
(Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004). This view is 
supported by Gordon and Henry (2005) who 
argue that RPTs rationally fulfil other eco-
nomic demands (such as the need for in-depth 
company knowledge or expertise) of a compa-
ny and serve as a mechanism that bond the 
party to the company. Consequently, it de-
creases the incentives to engage in risk taking 
behaviour such as EM that might jeopardise 
the relationship with the company.  
In addition, unique characteristics of 
Indonesian capital market which is character-
ised by majority of group-affiliate firms that 
involve in RPTs can provide further rationali-
zation for this finding. Despite the empirical 
evidence to date on the benefits and costs of 
group-affiliation is mixed and far from con-
clusive, several past studies have documented 
benefits associated with group-affiliated firms. 
Past literature suggest that group structure 
provide benefits for members through sharing 
intangible and financial resources with other 
member firms (Chang and Hong, 2000); facili-
tate development and provide an organisation-
al structure that is better suited to dealing with 
the poor availability of basic inputs and ser-
vices (Fishman and Khanna, 1998); or consti-
tute an efficient economic organisations that 
minimise the transactions costs from coming 
from the market inefficiencies prevalent in 
developing countries (Chang and Choi, 1988; 
Khanna and Palepu, 1997). In addition, Chang 
and Choi (1988) similar to Khanna and Palepu 
(1997) also contend that business group re-
place poorly performing or non existence eco-
nomic institutions (such as banks or external 
labour market) that are taken for granted in 
developed countries. Succinctly, this study in 
line with past studies (Chang and Choi, 1988; 
Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Fishman and 
Khanna, 1998; Chang and Hong, 2000) sug-
gests that the existence of RPTs does not nec-
essarily indicate that companies engage in ex-
tensive EM; there is not a clear linkage. 
Moreover, RPTs have been under 
regulator and media intense scrutiny following 
recent spectacular corporate collapses that 
manage earnings with RPTs such as Enron, 
Worldcom, and Parmalat (McCahery and 
Vermeulen, 2005). Consequently, managers 
might not see that RPTs as areas where they 
can easily manage earnings.  
Findings of this study have several im-
plications for key parties in accounting prac-
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tices, such as professional bodies, regulators, 
corporate governance reformists and share-
holders. Firstly, it can be implied that for-
mation of business groups in Indonesia with 
higher levels of RPTs do not necessarily indi-
cate that companies engage in greater EM. 
This result is supported by related past studies 
(Chang and Hong, 2000; Claessens, et al., 
2006). Those studies suggest that there may be 
gains from group-affiliations and RPTs and it 
is not necessarily inefficient even though these 
gains are followed by the rise of agency costs. 
The real concern might be the lack of corpo-
rate governance system that would guard 
against expropriation. Patrick (2002) asserts 
that Indonesian regulator’ challenge is to 
strengthen laws pertaining to corporate gov-
ernance and enforcing them.  
Several differences in the findings of 
this study relative to related past studies dur-
ing the IPO process (Jian and Wong, 2004; 
Aharony, et al., 2005; Cheng and Chen, 2007) 
might imply that the company managements’ 
incentives to manage earnings differs during 
IPO period and non-IPO periods. Perhaps ac-
counting standard setters should consider ad-
ditional accounting regulations to ensure ap-
propriate accounting practices are conducted 
during the IPO process.  
 Similar with two alternative views on 
RPTs, there are different views regarding EM 
practices. Arya, et al.(2003) question the ma-
jority view on EM – that it is against the best 
interest of shareholders. They argue that some 
accounting research show that income manip-
ulation is not an unmitigated evil; within lim-
its it promotes efficient decisions. This view is 
supported by Dechow and Skinner (2000) who 
contend that some EM is expected and should 
exist in capital markets because of the funda-
mental need for judgements and estimates to 
implement accrual accounting. The final im-
plication is that regulators and accounting 
practitioners are likely to be overstating the 
concern on EM practices.  
Although this study provides useful in-
sights into the extent and association of RPTs 
and EM in Indonesian publicly listed compa-
nies, a number of limitations and suggestions 
for future research are noted. This study utilis-
es relatively small samples of 50 Indonesian 
firms (25 manufacturing and 25 non-
manufacturing firms) for the period ending 
2004 and 2005. A longer term longitudinal 
study or use of larger samples is recommend-
ed, especially given the fact that there are dif-
ferences between the two years in this study. 
Furthermore, this study only uses one inde-
pendent variable (RPTs) and one dependent 
variable to predict EM behaviour. There might 
be various characteristics that can be included 
such as Indonesian ownership structure, cor-
porate governance practices, market valuation 
of effects, etc. Following past studies (Jian 
and Wong, 2004; Aharony et al., 2005; Cheng 
and Chen, 2007), future research can also be 
conducted on Indonesian IPO firms. In addi-
tion, the measurement of RPTs by aggregating 
several transactions might not be the best 
measure as, possibly several interesting fea-
tures can be found by disaggregating this 
measure. Therefore, future research can be 
conducted using different measures of RPTs 
such as the transactions with primary and sec-
ondary parties following Gordon and Henry 
(2005) research design. 
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11 IAS 24 paragraph 9 states that, “A related party transaction is a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between related 
parties, regardless of whether a price is charged”. 
2 Schipper (1989, p. 92) defines EM as, “purposeful intervention by management in the earnings determination process, usually 
to satisfy selfish objectives”. This study defines EM as the techniques employed by corporate management to alter earnings 
numbers to achieve a desired objective within the flexibility of the General Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP).  
3 Accounting accruals are defined as the difference between reported earnings and cash flow from operation. 
4 Johnson et al.(2000) propose that tunneling refers to the observed expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholders through the transferring of assets and profits out of the controlled firm for the benefit of the controlling share-
holders.  
5 The study proposes that controlling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-interest purposes and limit 
the information flows to the public, consequently the earnings credibility is weakened because minority shareholders anticipate 
that the ownership structure gives the controlling owners both the ability and the incentive to manipulate earnings for outright 
appropriation or to report uninformative earnings to avoid detection of their expropriation activities. 
6 The conclusion drawn by Leuz et al.(2003) is based on the sample of 31 countries including Indonesia. They find that Indonesia 
score relatively high in EM (18.3) compared to those of Australia (4.8) and United States (2.0). 
7  La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) also argues that in countries with poor shareholder protection, firms are typi-
cally controlled by family or state and large firms usually have controlling shareholders that have the power and interest to ex-
propriate the minority shareholders. 
8  The General Accounting Office (2003) identified RPTs as one of the nine major reasons requiring companies to restate finan-
cial statements (Gordon, Henry, and Palia, 2004). 
9  Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) define agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more (principals) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority 
to the agent”. 
10 Despite agency theory is the dominant view adopted in RPTs and EM studies, alternative theory is put forward. Contracting 
theory (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004) suggest that RPTs can be part of efficient contracting with related parties as a substitute 
for cash-based or more liquid compensation to officers and directors. In addition, RPTs are used to minimize transaction costs 
(Jian and Wong, 2004), fulfil other economic demands of a company as well as bonding mechanism to the company (Gordon 
and Henry, 2005). 
11 The study conducted by Fan and Wong (2002) is based on sample companies of East Asian economies including Indonesia, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
12 Manufacturing firms include firms in basic industry and chemicals, miscellaneous industry, consumer goods industry, property 
and real estate. 
13 Non-manufacturing firms include firms in agriculture, mining, infrastructure, utilities and transportation and trade, services and 
investments. 
14 JSX is the largest stock exchange in Indonesia with market capitalisation and number of listed companies in year 2005 (2004) 
of 801 (680) trillion IDR and 336 (331) companies respectively (Jakarta Stock Exchange, 2005). 
15 Indonesian Financial Accounting Standard (PSAK) No.7 in line with IAS 29 requires that firms disclose the RPTs in the notes 
to financial report (International Accounting Standard Board, 2005). 
16 Examples of transaction between related parties that may need to be disclosed by a reporting enterprise such as purchase or 
sale of goods, purchase or sale of property and other assets, rendering or receiving of services, transfer of research and devel-
opment, financing (including providing loan and equity contributions in cash or in kind), guarantees and collateral, and man-
agement contracts.  
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17 The main regression analysis utilise total amount of RPTs.  
18 The transactions are aggregated into assets, liabilities, revenue or expenses.  
19 There is no related party transaction in equity enclosed in the financial statements of sample companies.  
20 These RP financial statements transactions can be traced further to various types of RPTs. However, for the purpose of analysis 
only the major and material transactions with high frequency rates that constitute the RP financial statements transactions are 
presented individually. Other transactions that are rarely disclosed by companies and not material are aggregated in other 
transactions account.  
21Other assets consist of other transactions such as cash, other receivables, short-term investments, purchases advances, fi-
nancelease, etc. Refer to appendix for full list of transactions. 
22 Other liabilities consist of other transactions such as accrued interest, accrued salary and wages, long term loans, etc.  
23 Other expenses consist of transactions such as management fees, administration fees, interest expenses, etc. Refer to appendix 
for full lists of expenses. 
24 All minimum value of RPTs in Table 4.3 are zero (0). 
25 This studies measure related party transactions as a percentage of total assets. 
26 Johnson et al.(2000) propose that tunneling refers to the observed expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholders through the transferring of assets and profits out of the controlled firm for the benefit of the controlling share-
holders. 
27 Gordon and Henry (2005) use different classification for RPTs types. 
28 This value is industry adjusted asset-scaled discretionary accruals (DAC) of the year before IPOs’s from 239 Chinese-firms’ 
IPOs. 
29 Refer to section 4.3 for univariate analysis. 
30 Gordon and Henry (2005) suggest that political costs are negatively associated with EM. 
31 The studies conducted by Nurhayati et al.(2006) utilise sample of 100 Indonesian companies listed on JSX for the year ending 
2003.  
32 Although the observation is 50 companies two years data pooled together, the unequal percentage is due to companies changed 
auditors during the two-year period.  
33 As at June 2001, Arthur Andersen was still considered Big-5 firm. 
34 In Thailand, there is a case where the local auditors’ growth are higher compared to Big-4 audit firms (SCI Double Impact and 
Audit Plus, 2005). 
35 Additional Mann-Whitney U tests are conducted because the normality assumption of DAC cannot be assumed. The findings 
of all t-test are consistent with those of Mann-Whitney U test. 
36 The test on net assets is conducted based on the logic that companies might engage in RPT transactions that boost their net 
assets as a way to manage earnings.  
37 Stepwise regression is conducted to confirm the results of the initial regression. The results of stepwise regression confirm that 
there are no significant variables in the model.  
